UM #6: The Relative in the Absolute

[Josh]

6/2/06:

Some further thoughts I had during this dialogue:

First, I may not have been clear in what I mean by absolute values from the very beginning. I fear I may have lead you to believe that I think that there are values which are always right in a given situation. I hope you understand that I believe all values can be wrong or right depending upon the situation; bravery isn't always the right thing to do; being kind isn't always right (especially if it's not mixed with justice). So I guess I should delineate between my beliefs about Absolute Values and Absolute Right and Wrong and I'd also leave room for Relativity within Absolute Morality.

I do believe in Absolute Values: that is, values that most cultures have striven for and agreed on (at least in theory) throughout history. You can say those things arose because they were practical, beneficial, etc. and I would agree with you. I don't think they were just arbitrarily dropped from the sky on some tablet from heaven; they make sense. I just think they make sense within the world that God has created.

Now I would define Absolute Right and Wrong by saying that there are indeed things which are absolutely wrong in any given instance. How do I know which things are absolutely wrong? Well, I could take two approaches. I could say that the things which are absolutely wrong are probably those things which most have declared taboo; murder, etc. but of course, although all cultures would agree that 'murder' is wrong, they would all define what murder is differently. So we all have this vague value, but we all define it differently, so who are we to say which interpretation is absolutely wrong. And from this perspective, you are absolutely right. If you would just concede that all world cultures have a general agreement on basic (albeit vague) notions of values, then that would be enough. You can say that's because it only makes sense biologically and that would be fine with me. However, you must also concede that we alone appear to be the only species concerned with morality and values. This is one of the few things that ultimately separate us from the animal world; with the animals there is no struggle of the will, no struggle to make the 'moral choice'. And there are a few other differences: awareness of mortality and religious expression are the others I can think of off the cuff.

OK, but how then can I say that we can know what is Absolutely Wrong and Right after all? Well, of course the Christian answer to that is that God has revealed much of that to us through His Word. Now, Scripture itself teaches this: the world at large has a general sense of right and wrong, put into them by God: "Indeed, when Gentiles, who do not have the [written] Law, do by nature things required by the law, those are a law for themselves, even though they do not have the [written] Law, since they show that the requirements of the law are written on their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts not accusing, now even defending them." Romans 2:14-15.

But although all human cultures have a general awareness of morality and conscience, it is in the pages of Scripture that God gets specific about right and wrong, with no ambiguity. You may think this is an egotistical claim; but that' s off the point; the Bible claims that, so let's examine the claim and not react emotionally.

How do I establish the authority, reliability, and truthfulness of Scripture? That’s an important question to be dealt with elsewhere.

Another thing: the reason world cultures have so many different interpretations of morality is not because they don't have basically the same ideals; they just argue about which ones are more important! I'm sure those Germans who refused to enter the army still think bravery can be a good thing- and important thing. They just happened to think that forbearance, or tolerance, or self-preservation was more important. Two values were in conflict, and they picked the one they thought was most important. So, they believe in both values, they just had to make a difficult choice- the Relative in the Absolute.

[hume]

7/6/06:

"although all cultures would agree that 'murder' is wrong, they would all define what murder is differently. So we all have this vague value, but we all define it differently, so who are we to say which interpretation is absolutely wrong."

You may be giving away more than you need to here. When dealing with definitions, there's a philosophical concept I've found helpful: "borderline cases." An example would be trying to define "red." Whatever definition you decide on, someone can reply, "yes, but look at that reddish-orange thing over there -- is it red, or isn't it?" A physicist might offer an absolute, measurable definition -- but this seems artificial; whatever wavelength of light he specifies as defining the boundary between red and orange, when someone looks at an object reflecting that wavelength, they will have difficulty deciding whether or not it looks red, regardless of the read-out on the scientist's device. This also runs up against the subjectivity of color perception: if the same object appears reddish to you and orange-ish to me, how can we arrive at an agreement about its exact color? These are borderline cases for the definition of red.

But one thing we can all agree on is: there really is *something* (some actual experience) which is correctly referred to as "seeing a red object." So clearly there's something here to define. The difference between an "obviously red object" and an orange-red borderline case is much less than the difference between an obviously red object and an obviously blue object. The fact that there are borderline cases, and the fact that we can't seem to land on a definition that excludes all such cases, does not do away with the basic validity of the notion "red." Ask a matador whether red is a real experience -- he trusts his life to it from time to time.

It may be that the definition is somewhat faulty or inadequate -- but again, it's still an inadequate attempt to define SOMETHING. Our dissatisfaction with such a definition is due to the fact that we intuit something real, and we recognize that the definition doesn't quite do it justice. Or it may be that the concept itself is inherently a little vague (e.g., maybe when we see a reddish-orange object, there's really no answer to the question, "is that red or not?"). In that case, these borderline instances simply place fuzzy edges on the set of objects that can be called either red or not red; what they don't do is demonstrate that "there's no such thing as a red object."

So when people object to a concept by tossing out counter-examples, it helps to step back and consider whether those are important contradictions or just borderline cases. Definitions of moral terms like "murder" often undergo this kind of scrutiny: "But what about scenario X? Would that be murder or not?" If you can't answer clearly or consistently, the questioner wants to conclude that "there's no such thing as a meaningful definition of murder." But you can't erase distinctions that easily.

[hume]

7/6/06:

We "can sensibly discuss how many books I have on my shelf, for example, only if we both agree, at least roughly, about what a book is. We can disagree over borderline cases: I may call something a slim book that you would call a pamphlet. But we cannot disagree over what I [call] pivotal cases ... if you do not count my copy of Moby-Dick as a book because in your view novels are not books," then we're disagreeing over a "pivotal case." [from Ronald Dworkin, Law's_Empire, p. 45] When we disagree over borderline examples, we're still in basic agreement about the concept under discussion -- we're just working out some of the finer points (or, we're running up against the fact that our definition, while pretty good, is not quite perfect). Disagreement over pivotal cases indicates that we're not on the same page at all -- in fact we're probably talking past each other, using the same word ("book" in this case) to refer to different concepts, probably without each realizing what the other is doing. (Extreme examples of this might occur in discussions between fluent and non-fluent speakers of a language.)

[Josh]

Thanks a lot. Part of my whole motive in posting this stuff is to 'sharpen' my thinking and writing on these type of themes (or, if need be, completely overhaul). Keep it coming.

On this subject in particular, the skills of the logician and philosopher are most helpful indeed.